No. 1207 - 15 July 1945

3. Japanese correspondent in Berne urges peace: Latest in the series of messages from Japanese in Switzerland containing arguments in favor of ending the war is one of 9 July from Shintaro Ryu, a representative of the newspaper Asahi. His argument is long, involved, and at times inconsistent, but seems to be based on the premise that England and America would be willing to arrive at a quick negotiated peace in the Far East in order to prevent Russia from coming into the war. The following are excerpts from Ryu’s message:

a. "While the Americans may still have ‘unconditional surrender’ on their lips, it would not be an error to conclude that this is merely the 'asking price' and that they are prepared to allow some discount. ... It should be noted that Truman has not used the word unconditional in his recent statements about Japan. Perhaps the statement of Senator Capehart ^{Capehart had been quoted in the New York Times as believing the war might be ended earlier if the U.S. clarified the terms of surrender See pages 82, 83, and 125 of Unconditional: The Japanese Surrender in World War II, Marc Gallicchio .} ... might be taken as reflecting the atmosphere within the United States in regard to peace terms."

b. "As far as Great Britain is concerned, it is now quite clear that Churchill, who is facing a general election and is confronted with a distressing situation in Europe, would be only too glad to reach some settlement of the Japanese question. Of late, there have been very few British declarations on the Japanese question, and there is a surprising discrepancy between the amount of interest shown in the war against Japan and the interest shown in the war against Germany."

c. "Once the invasion of our homeland has begun there will be no turning back. ... The enemy will suffer heavy losses, but the European war has shown that the overwhelming power of air bombardments makes possible the success of such landing operations. Once such a landing succeeds, the war will assume tragic proportions. We will literally have to fight to the last woman and child."

d. "I know that the easiest course would be to continue fighting, and I know how difficult it is to lay aside one's arms; but at this juncture, a truly great general would cast aside his arms to save his Emperor and his people."

e. "I realize that the maintenance of our military power in some form is necessary to our nation's continued existence. If our nation survives I feel quite sure that our military power will survive, although in some altered form, while at least at the beginning we shall be exposed to the present arrogant and cruel disposition of the United States. Our spiritual independence and our people's soundness will remain intact. By suffering and enduring now, we shall help to give rise to a completely new Japan within 50 years or so. We will simply have to leave this task to the next generation."

f. "I assure you that the ideas I have expressed are not confined to my own unworthy person. I may have been rather forward in my statements, but I believe that most of us who have studied and observed this problem from Europe secretly cherish the same desire."

Note: Ryu, who has before now made recommendations unusual for a newspaper correspondent, appears to be a person of some influence. A Chinese message from Berne last March referred to him as a friend of Prince Konoye Three times Premier of Japan in the pre-war years. Not an "imperial prince", "Duke" would be a better translation of his title, but "Prince" is traditional. The Wikipedia article about him is long and accurate. , and that characterization was repeated by Prince Konoye’s brother, Hidemaro, after the latter had surrendered to U.S. troops in Germany. Hidemaro Konoye also stated that (a) Prince Konoye had sent Ryu to Switzerland to safeguard him from persecution by chauvinistic Japanese for his liberal leanings, (b) Hidemaro Konoye’s action in surrendering to the Americans, although instructed to go to the Russian sector, had been suggested by a note received from Ryu last December, (c) in that note Ryu had said that Prince Konoye was deeply worried about the situation and would like to get in touch with Under Secretary Grew ^{Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew, formerly Ambassador to Japan 1932-1942, was known to believe Japan's emperor had not been in favor of the war and that the imperial institution might be allowed to remain post-war to aid in reform of Japan. For this and other reasons, widely criticized during the war as "an appeaser", though he was vehement in insistence that Japan's militarism must be stamped out. An excellent treatment of Grew and his views of Japan's politics can be found in Nakamura Masanori's The Japanese Monarchy, 1931-91: Ambassador Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System"} , (d) Hidemaro Konoye was willing to act as a go-between to arrange such a meeting.