Alperovitz's "The Decision to Use the Atmoic Bomb"

Home

Being fluent in Japanese -- the result of a 50-year relationship with the nation -- I feel the issues in Alperovitz's "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" extremely important, and have spent thousands of dollars and hours in research on them, reading in Japanese not only the latest histories but also many of the diaries and other primary documents on which they're based, plus most of what's been written in English, plus nearly all the Bletchley Park intercepts of WWII Japanese diplomatic messages in the UK National Archives.

From this I conclude the best way to succinctly review "The Decision" is to focus on how it treats the historical record, and so have listed below important items of the record and discussed how Alperovitz et al deal with them. Because this review was originally written for Amazon, which imposes a 20k character limit, it has been pruned to very terse prose. Someday I will expand it with hyperlinks to more detailed exposition.

Background:

Key people:

Emperor Hirohito (Commander in Chief of Army and Navy)
Marquis Kido (Emperor's political advisor)
Supreme Council for Direction of the War (SCDW):

Premier Suzuki (no power over military, less powerful than Kido)
Foreign Minister Togo
Army Minister & Chief of Staff (Generals Anami & Umezu)
Navy Minister & Chief of Staff (Admirals Yonai & Toyoda)

President Truman
Sec. of State Byrnes
Under Sec. of State Grew (Ambassador to Japan 1932-1942)
State Dept. Japan specialists Dooman & Ballantine
Asst. Sec. of State Acheson & MacLeish
Sec. of War Stimson
Army Chief of Staff Gen. Marshall

Potsdam Declaration ^{Some Potsdam Declaration content.}

Issued 26 July 1945 at Truman/Churchill/Stalin summit near Berlin
Clarified terms of "unconditional surrender"
Stated occupation would end when "a peacefully inclined and responsible government [had been established by] the freely expressed will of the Japanese people". Controversy surrounds final excision of additional provision that "This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if [it can be shown] such a government will never again aspire to aggression."

The items:

Interviewed postwar by US, Premier Suzuki stated SCDW beliefs as:
- before the atomic bombings, that Japan couldn't be beaten by bombing alone, so US would believe it imperative to invade (rocket-engine fighters were to counter B-29s);
- that their sole plan was to fight a decisive battle at the landing points;
- after the atomic bombings, that with such a weapon US would not think invasion needed, so they sued for peace.
Near war-end, Navy Vice Chief of Staff Onishi told a friend that Japan was going to pull its troops in Manchuria back southward into a defensive position and allow Soviet and Red Chinese forces to flood into the vacated areas, bringing them into confrontation with Chiang Kai Shek's armies, and perhaps even draw US forces into confrontation with the Soviets. He believed that if Japan could then severely maul a US landing on the homeland, that would buy time, enabling Japan to negotiate peace "as the international situation develops." (i.e., as US-Soviet relations sour)
Anami expected army in Manchuria to hold out against a late-August Soviet invasion for 2-3 months, and predicted fighting on to force US to invade Japan would lead it to soften terms to end war quickly to avoid communization of East Asia and northern Japan.
US Army also expected no quick Soviet victory in Manchuria, predicting Japan would "obtain initial successes", and the Soviets "[might] begin to roll, say some 30 days after the initial attack."
In meetings 11-14 May, SCDW began to discuss peace maneuvers, and rejected idea of mediation by China, Swiss, Sweden or Vatican. Umezu opined Stalin alone could mediate favorable terms. Anami added Stalin would fall out with US/UK postwar and not want Japan overly weakened. Umezu and Anami argued terms should reflect that Japan still held much enemy territory, and US/UK held almost no Japan territory. When Togo declared this unrealistic, the atmosphere "grew threatening". There was no agreement on terms.
In June, Togo sent Former Premier Hirota to propose to Soviet Ambassador wide-ranging concessions for Soviet aid, even seeking an anti-US/UK alliance with, "Japan will increase her naval strength in the future, and that, together with the Russian Army, would make a force unequaled in the world. [So] Japan would like to have Russia provide ... oil, in return for ... rubber, tin, lead, tungsten and other commodities from the south." US leaders learned this 3 July from a message intercept.
On 13 July, regarding message intercepts revealing Japan's diplomatic initiative known as "peace feelers through the Soviet Union" (part of item 6 gambit to bribe Stalin to aid Japan), Grew agreed with Army G2 this was most likely only a ploy to stave off defeat by exploiting US war-weariness.
In a 17 July message of the "peace feelers", US leaders read Togo stating "... we are not asking the Russians' mediation in anything like unconditional surrender."
In 21 July reply to Ambassador-in-Moscow Sato's warning the "peace feelers" had no chance of success unless Japan clearly stated its conditions, Togo replied it "both disadvantageous and impossible, from ... foreign and domestic considerations, [to declare] specific terms." Truman learned this on 22 July.
On 27 July, receiving the Potsdam Declaration, The Foreign Ministry's officials agreed it should be accepted, but the SCDW did not agree. Togo's first reaction was that the wording "Following are our terms," meant it was "not a dictate of unconditional surrender." Ministry officials opined that the "freely expressed will of the Japanese people" wording allowed an emperor.
On 28 July, Suzuki announced Declaration would be ignored. Yonai remarked, "[The first to speak] is always at a disadvantage. Churchill has fallen, America is beginning to be isolated. [We'll] ignore it. ...no need to rush."
In 3 August cabinet meeting, Suzuki rejected cabinet advisors' urging to immediately accept the Declaration, saying it showed US was desperate and would yield first if Japan held its course, and "I see no need to stop the war."
On 8 August, Japan's scientists confirmed Hiroshima bomb of 6 August atomic, and Hirohito ordered Togo to cease angling for terms and end the war at once, and to so inform Suzuki, who scheduled SCDW and cabinet meetings for that purpose for the 9th.
At 00:01AM 9 August, the Red Army invaded Manchuria with 1.5 million men, prepared for 540,000 casualties. Per item 2, Japan's army of 700,000+ began withdrawal from central Manchuria to a mountain redoubt northwest of Korea, leaving border garrisons to slow Soviet advance, and a million colonists defenseless. (On news of Hiroshima, Stalin ordered attack ASAP.)
On 9 August the SCDW, _after_ atomic bombings and Soviet attack, finally began debate on terms. Togo argued it futile to ask for more than "safety of the Imperial House", but Umezu, Anami and Toyoda insisted rather on "preservation of the Kokutai" (i.e., the "National Polity" -- the existing system of government founded on the dogma of Imperial divinity), plus three more conditions: no (or only token) military occupation, disarmament only by Japan itself, and no war crime trials except by Japan itself. Suzuki reported those four to Kido as the SCDW position. But Konoye and others convinced Kido such demands would lead to complete US rejection, leading to the midnight conference in which Hirohito forced acceptance of Togo's position.
On 10 August Japan tentatively accepted the Potsdam Declaration "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler". The intent was explicitly that the US thereby legally recognize the Emperor's sovereignty as transcending earthly law, absolute and inherent in his divine descent.
Appalled that Byrnes might not see the implications of item 16, Grew, Dooman and Ballantine -- the very drafters of the "constitutional monarchy" provision -- rushed to oppose, as they knew exactly how those "prerogatives" empowered militarism and aggression, had drafted the plans for reforms to end that, and knew acceptance would preclude them. (Note: "under the present dynasty" was used exactly because Grew et al opposed an explicit guarantee for Hirohito, believing he must abdicate postwar.)
Stimson's 10 August diary says regarding Truman and Byrnes' removal of the "constitutional monarchy" provision that, "[they]" thought they could arrange it in the necessary secret negotiations which would take place after any armistice."
On 12 August, Yonai observed, "... the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are, in a sense, gifts from heaven. They let us end the fighting without revealing we quit the war due to domestic conditions."
On 15 August Red Army advance in Manchuria slowed as it outran supply lines in the west and met stiff resistance in the east. On the 16th, on orders from Tokyo, the army pleaded for ceasefire, granted on the 19th. Abandonment of the plan to fight to the last man cut combat deaths to only 40,000 in Japan's regular army, 13,000 in Russia's. But Stalin enslaved 594,000 demobilized soldiers in Siberia for years under conditions so severe 60,000 died. Despite early ceasefire, Japanese noncombatant deaths totaled 240,000 (180,000 colonists, 60,000 enslaved ex-soldiers).
On 3 May 1947 Japan ratified a Constitution bestowing all sovereignty on the people, reducing Emperor to a powerless symbol of the state. Earlier, he had been induced to publicly declare as false the notions that he was a god in human form and the Japanese were a superior race destined to rule the world. The "Kokutai" was not preserved.
Asked in 1950 whether it was the atomic bomb or Soviet attack that brought surrender, Kido replied he and Hirohito saw in the bomb the war-ending opportunity they'd been awaiting, as the Army could save face by saying they'd been beaten not in combat but by US science, and hardliners in the populace would be too terrified to oppose surrender. He opined the bomb alone would probably have been sufficient.
In the same 1950 interview, told some in the US believed issuing the Declaration in April or May would have brought earlier surrender, Kido disagreed, explaining in detail it might have had the opposite effect, as a sign of failing US resolve.
In November 1918 Germany's army had informed its government defeat was inevitable and it must sue for peace. Though US General Pershing urged that the war be carried into Germany to make it taste true defeat, predicting not doing so would enable militarists to rise again, his warning was not heeded. Bled by years of war, the democracies agreed to an armistice with front lines still in France and Belgium, letting German troops march home with military honor to be disarmed by Germany itself, and permitted retention of a 100,000-man army, an elite core around which it rose again. Germany got off with limited occupation, no externally imposed changes to its government, and was allowed to conduct its own war-crime trials.
For the first 15 months of WWII, Stalin had found geopolitical advantage in virtual alliance with Germany, supplying food and materials, and in Nov. 1940 would have joined the Axis had Hitler agreed on spheres of influence. Japan too wished this, and after Germany's invasion of Russia stalled, tried repeatedly to broker a negotiated peace to sever Stalin's alliance with the US/UK and make him again a partner in the Axis "new world order". As German defeat loomed, it was an article of faith in Japan that US/UK-Soviet ties would fray, and that if they gifted Stalin all he wanted in East Asia he'd take their side in negotiations (especially as he'd not want Japan to fall too much under US sway). (Recall items 2, 3, 5, and 6.)

How does "The Decision" deal with the above?

Essentially, it doesn't. A reader will find not a trace of them in "The Decision", except for the barest facts of items 14 and 16.

How can this be so, in a huge book billed as a "definitive history", the product of seven co-authors and a small army of researchers, six employed full time apparently for about ten person-years total? Especially since all except items 2, 3, 12, 22, 23 and part of 10 were in English-language sources available to them. And why does its "Acknowledgments" name not one of the Japanese-fluent American historians who could have supplied the others, and vital insights?

Why does this matter?

Alperovitz summarizes his thesis in his preface as follows:

[The critical issue] is whether it was understood ... that the war ... could be ended by other means without significant loss of life."
B "First, to what degree was the president [advised and did understand] that a clarification of the demand for 'unconditional surrender' specifying that Japan could keep its Emperor would be likely to end the war?"
C "Second, to what degree was he [advised and did understand] that "a Russian declaration of war might itself bring about an early end to the fighting?"

Regarding these, note that Alperovitz does not just imply that there were ways to end the war with less loss of life (and portrays Russian entry into the war as one such). He also implies that those ways would have ended it on acceptable terms. Moreover, he implies that the record so supports this as to justify writing "understand" rather than "might have thought possible".

But as is clear in any review of "The Decision", its real main theme is:

that Truman and Byrnes' true reason for bomb use was to intimidate the Soviet Union, and to do this by demonstrating the bombs' power and US ruthlessness by use against cities;
that to prolong the war until the bomb could be used, they delayed surrender terms clarification via the Potsdam Declaration until Japan would have too little time to react, and excised the monarchy provision expressly to ensure rejection;
that post-war claims that the bombs saved hundreds of thousands of lives that would otherwise have been lost in the invasion required to force a surrender weren't just exaggerations—rather, they were prima facie evidence of Truman's mendacity, because he ostensibly knew no invasion was required, as the war could be ended on acceptable terms by the means of items B and C above.

Does the historical record support this?

Keep in mind that since Allied leaders knew the terms granted Germany in WWI had brought a second world war in just two decades, they were not going to let Japan out of the war on any terms that would not both discredit its military and permit planned postwar occupation and reforms.

As the items above show, Japan's leaders had a coherent plan to gain by brinksmanship a peace like that which ended WWI (Togo's memoirs state this explicilty), and per Suzuki in item 1 and abandoned it only when faced with the atomic bomb.

Basically, their plan was to:

convince Americans that defeating them would mean a fight to the death against not only the two million troops and multi-million "volunteer combat corps" in Japan, but also four million more troops in the conquered lands;
offer Stalin incentives to aid Japan against the capitalist democracies as he had aided Germany prior to its 1941 attack, and
threaten the prospect both of (b) and that when the Soviets entered the war, the US would face the dilemma envisioned by Onishi in item 2 (see also items 1, 3, 6, 11, 12 and 25).

Had US not had the bomb, it might have worked.

Note it was not until after both the atomic bombings and Russian entry into the war that the SCDW could agree even on the unacceptable terms of item 15. Claims they might earlier have agreed to surrender on acceptable terms have no basis in the record (see items 5 and 23).

Regarding assertions that "clarification of the ... demand for 'unconditional surrender' specifying that Japan could keep its Emperor would [have been] likely to end the war,", note:

the Potsdam Declaration clarified the terms and was seen as making surrender conditional, and to most in Japan its terms were acceptable;
the Foreign Ministry viewed the wording that allowed the Japanese people to choose their ultimate form of government as allowing choice of a form including an Emperor;
per items 11 and 12 the declaration was seen as a sign of US weakness;
per Kido in item 23 an earlier declaration would likely have encouraged continued war;
the historical record contains not a single lament by any Japanese official that earlier clarification would have brought surrender.

Ponder why, if the future of the Emperor was truly the only impediment to surrender, was the message of 10 August (item 16) not sent earlier?

Turning to removal of the monarchy provision from the Declaration, note:

liberals in the State Department (esp. Acheson and MacLeish) opposed the provision on the grounds that the Emperor system was the keystone of Japanese militarism;
the JCS requested removal because "under the present dynasty" might imply intent to depose Hirohito and place some other member of the dynasty on the throne (Grew's actual intent, per item 17, and an interpretation Japanese hardliners would surely have made);
former Sec. of State Cordell Hull opposed inclusion, pointing out it might in fact encourage continued resistance (note items 11, 12, 23);
the wording as issued, allowing the Japanese people to choose their own form of government, implicitly allowed constitutional monarchy and was so seen in the Foreign Ministry;
it was natural to hold back for final negotiations the only point on which the US was willing to compromise (per Stimson's diary, item 18).

Would waiting for Soviet entry have been preferable? Note:

Soviets, Japan and US all expected combat in Manchuria to continue for months;
elements in Japan intended to exploit it for geopolitical leverage;
Red Army prepared for more than half a million casualties, 160,000 deaths;
the plan to fight to the last man would have meant death to nearly 700,000 Japanese soldiers and hundreds of thousands more colonists;
despite early ceasefire Japanese non-combatant deaths exceeded those of Hiroshima + Nagaski.

So why does The Decision ignore the items I've listed? Basically, because it is in fact not a work of history. Read it with a critical eye and solid grounding in the historical record and you'll see it is, rather, a political tract aiming to place the blame for the Cold War and nuclear arms race on Truman and Byrnes, rather than Stalin. A dead give-away is that you'll find in it no criticism of Stalin's many actions that led to US distrust, and in particular none of his order to attack Manchuria at once on news of Hiroshima.

Alperovitz's abuse of the historical record goes beyond the omissions I've listed here; it extends to distortions of the views of Marshall, Grew and others there's no space to describe here.

Sadly, The Decision's promulgation of the myth that lack of "assurances for the Emperor" was the only impediment to peace has resulted in misinformed journalists having turned that into a meme encountered in the media whenever the bombings are discussed, and this has aided the resurgence of the racist far right in Japan, which portrays the nation as the pitiful victim of evil foreigners.